Explaining cooperative behaviour is a fundamental issue for evolutionary biology. The challenge for any cooperative strategy is to minimize the risks of nonreciprocation (cheating) in interactions with immediate costs and delayed benefits. One of a variety of proposed strategies, the raise-the-stakes (RTS) strategy, posits that individuals establish cooperation by increasing investment across interactions from an initial interaction. This model has received little quantitative support, however, probably because individuals of many social species engage in repeated interactions from a young age. In some situations, however, such as following conflicts, after prolonged absences or during social instability, established relationships may become unreliable predictors of future behaviour, creating an environment for RTS. We investigated grooming interactions among wild male chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, testing RTS in these specific contexts. We found evidence to support the view that male chimpanzees employed RTS during social instability, but not under the other conditions. However, we also found that the duration of episodes (discrete parcels) of grooming was negatively related to aggression risk and in consequence suggest that the patterning of grooming interactions indicative of RTS was less to do with preventing cheating, and more to do with avoiding the elevated risks of intramale aggression during the period of social instability. We interpret the apparent support for RTS in our data as a by-product of the way chimpanzees cope with fluctuating (here, elevated then diminishing) risks of aggression. We suggest that social instability raises the stakes for grooming by creating a more hazardous marketplace in which to trade. Ó
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Explaining cooperative behaviour is a fundamental question for evolutionary biology (West et al. 2006 ). While cooperation between related individuals is often accounted for by indirect benefits and inclusive fitness theory (Hamilton 1964a, b) , cooperation between unrelated individuals is typically explained by invoking the theory of reciprocal altruism (Trivers 1971) with its exchange of direct costs and benefits, albeit delayed in time. Functionally, however, this is mutualism rather than altruism as all actors receive direct fitness benefits and is better described as direct reciprocity (Clutton-Brock 2009).
The challenge for any cooperative strategy is to minimize risks of nonreciprocation (cheating) in interactions in which costs are immediate but benefits are delayed. A variety of strategies have been proposed, building on the iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) model suggested by Trivers (1971) . Axelrod & Hamilton's (1981) 'tit-fortat' strategy (TfT), under which individuals start out cooperating and match their opponent's behaviour in previous interactions, refusing to cooperate only if the partner does so first, is evolutionarily stable. TfT has found some support but seems restricted to simple social exchanges (e.g. serranid coral reef hermaphroditic fish: Fischer 1988), or artificial experimental situations (e.g. predator inspection by sticklebacks and guppies : Milinski 1987; Dugatkin 1988) . Strategies based on an IPD model assume cooperation to be an 'all-or-nothing' affair, and that interacting individuals have no other potential social partners (Noë 1990 (Noë , 2001 ); in consequence, a variety of further models with more applicability to biological systems have been proposed, such as biological markets theory (Noë & Hammerstein 1994 , 1995 Noë 2001 Noë , 2006 , pseudoreciprocity (Connor 1986), parcelling (Connor 1992) and raise-the-stakes (Roberts & Sherratt 1998; Sherratt & Roberts 2002) .
Raise-the-stakes (RTS) describes a strategy in which cooperators increase investment in a social interaction if the partner matches or betters its opponent's last move. It allows cooperation to be incremental, rather than 'all-or-nothing', and individuals' investment in a relationship can vary over a series of interactions (Roberts & Sherratt 1998; Sherratt & Roberts 1999) . RTS allows the animals to 'test the water', before investing in potentially costly cooperative behaviours; at the very least, it allows them to limit their losses.
